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THE JUDGE'S ROLE IN THE ENFORCEMENT
OF ETHICS-FEAR AND LEARNING IN THE
PROFESSION
John M. Levy*
A token course on ethics might be worse than none, for it
may create an illusion pregnant with mischief.'
I. INTRODUCTION
This article deals with one small, though important, part
of the professional disciplinary system-the duty of judges to
report unprofessional conduct of which they become aware.'
The genesis of this article was my work as a clinical law
teacher simultaneously observing the academic and the practi-
cal parts of the profession. As a law teacher working with stu-
dents in their early experiences with the practice of law, I
have been struck by what appears to be a lack of ethical sensi-
tivity-awareness of problems of professional responsibility.$
For example, when students are interviewing clients, analyz-
ing problems, and exploring various alternatives open to the
clients, they often fail to spot the ethical questions that arise."
© 1982 by John M. Levy
* Associate Professor of Law and Director of Clinical Education, Mar-
shall-Wythe School of Law; B.A., 1962, New York University; J.D., 1968, Syracuse
University.
1. Burger, Annual Report on the State of the Judiciary-1980, 66 A.B.A.J. 295,
296 (1980).
2. "A judge should take or initiate appropriate disciplinary measures against a
judge or lawyer for unprofessional conduct of which the judge may become aware."
ABA CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT CANON No. 3B(3) (1980).
The requirement in Canon 11 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics, the predecessor
of the Code of Judicial Conduct, was similar. "A judge should utilize his opportunities
to criticise and correct unprofessional conduct of attorneys and counsellors, brought
to his attention; and if adverse comment is not a sufficient corrective, should send the
matter at once to the proper investigating and disciplinary authorities." ABA CANONS
OF JUDICIAL ETHICS No. 11.
3. "[W]e observe that issues about the lawyer's role, his ethics, and his compe-
tence are largely unnoticed or ignored in approaching and solving a client's problem."
T. SHAFFER & R. REDMOUNT, LAWYERS, LAW STUDENTS AND PEOPLE 118 (1977).
4. It is possible that the students do "spot" the ethical questions but fail to
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Yet, these same students in the same interviews usually are
able to spot and articulate most legal issues with alacrity. As
most students have had courses in both the substantive law
and professional ethics, it piqued my curiosity as to why the
legal issues were spotted and articulated while the ethical is-
sues were apparently neither spotted nor articulated.
The other impetus for the ideas suggested here came
from a specific incident that arose in working with a student
on a case. We were handling a case in which we believed there
had been a violation of the Code of Professional Responsibil-
ity by another lawyer. As a result, we were obligated to file a
complaint5 with the Virginia State Bar.' The lawyer had with-
held the decree of divorce from a woman because she had not
paid all of the lawyer's fee. The Virginia State Bar has previ-
ously found to be improper the similar practice of a lawyer's
refusal to obtain the divorce decree because the lawyer's fee
had not been paid.7 The student did some additional research
on the question before we ultimately made the decision to file
the complaint. In his research the student came upon the Vir-
ginia Supreme Court case of Moore v. Moore.$ In the state-
ment of the facts was the following sentence: "Counsel denied
that he had failed to communicate with his adversary, assert-
ing that during the previous October he had notified the hus-
band's attorney that he would not seek entry of a final decree
because his attorney's fee had not been paid by the wife."'
The court did not say anything about what appears to be a
prima facie case of a violation of the Code of Professional Re-
sponsibility.10 This posed a dilemma. Here was the highest ar-
biter of Virginia lawyers' ethics setting out in a published
opinion an admission of an apparent ethical violation by an
articulate them. It is, however, difficult to determine whether that is the case, and in
either event, it is doubtful that that question is particularly relevant to the ethical
problems of the profession.
5. VIRGINIA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DISCIPLINARY RULE No. 1-
103(A)(1976)(duty to file).
6. The Virginia disciplinary system is found in VA. CODE §§ 54-74 (1980). See
also Green v. Virginia State Bar Assoc., 411 F. Supp. 512 (E.D.Va. 1976)(a descrip-
tion of the system in use).
7. VIRGINIA STATE BAR PROFESSIONAL HANDBOOK, INFORMAL LEGAL ETHICS OPIN-
IONS Nos. 62 and 445 (January 1975). See also ABA COMM. ON ETHICS AND PROFES-
SIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, INFORMAL OPINION No. 1455 (June 1980).
8. 218 Va. 790, 240 S.E.2d 535 (1978).
9. Id. at 792, 240 S.E.2d at 536.
10. See note 7 supra.
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attorney, yet there was not even a comment by the court on
the possibility that the conduct described might be prohib-
ited. Did this indicate that in the court's view such action was
permissible, no matter what the Ethics Committee of the
State Bar might say? If such was the case, it made no sense to
make the complaint, and it might even be considered mali-
cious or wrong to do so. Further research made it apparent
that courts rarely comment on what appears to be clear ethi-
cal violations set out in their description of lawyer's actions in
the cases they were deciding.1" Therefore, we concluded that
the absence of a statement in Moore did not indicate the Vir-
ginia Supreme Court's position on the ethical violation which
it had set out in the facts of the case. A complaint was made
to the disciplinary committee of the Virginia State Bar." Our
resolve, however, was sorely tested by the court's opinion in
Moore.
It is the premise of this article that there is a connection
between the fact that law students do not identify and articu-
late ethical questions when they are presented with them in
actual practice situations and the fact that courts, especially
appellate courts, do not discuss ethical violations presented by
the cases before them. Courts, therefore, have a significant
role to play in both the enforcement and teaching (fear and
learning) of the ethical responsibilities of lawyers. Appellate
courts in their written opinions must, sua sponte, set out any
serious ethical question which the record or the conduct of the
lawyers brings to their attention and, moreover, state that the
question is being referred to the appropriate agency for
investigation.
This article will set out two separate but complementary
justifications for this proposition. First, that such action by
courts is essential for the teaching of ethics in law school. Sec-
ond, that action is equally essential for the effective operation
of the disciplinary system.
11. See, e.g., Roadway Express Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752 (1980).
12. The action complained of was subsequently found not to have been a viola-
tion. VIRGINIA STATE BAR PROFESSIONAL HANDBOOK, INFORMAL LEGAL ETHICS OPINION
No. 450 (1975). The Committee, however, was not unanimous. Letter to author from
Committee Chairman on file.
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II. THE ROLE OF COURTS IN TEACHING (LEARNING) ETHICS
The teaching of professional ethics, like other subjects in
law school, had traditionally been segregated in a separate
course."3 We in effect told students, "Now you will think and
learn about Torts. Now stop. Now you will think and learn
about Ethics. Now stop." The limitations and distortions from
this type of teaching and learning are clear."' For quite some
years the "pervasive approach" to the teaching of ethics has
been advocated'" and probably adopted by most law schools
and law professors. That approach "requires that . . . the
faculty take special care to point out and discuss in their reg-
ular courses various latent professional responsibility issues
... .[T]he aim is to lead the student to recognize profes-
sional responsibility issues that are suggested by cases in the
casebook "1.... 6 If one of the objects of legal education is to
"sensitize the student to professional responsibility issues-to
enable him to recognize and be concerned about them,"' 7 in
addition to having students memorize a set of rules,'" clearly
then that task must "pervade" legal education. The question
then presents itself: How can the teaching of ethics in law
school be "pervasive" in any meaningful way when what law
students spend the huge bulk of their time reading, thinking
about, discussing and truly making a part of him or her-
13. M. KELLY, LEGAL ETHICS AND LEGAL EDUCATION, 23-29 (1980)(history of
teaching ethics in law school).
14. "We cannot expect too much from ethics classes held, like church services, a
couple of hours a week." Weinstein, On the Teaching of Legal Ethics, 72 COLUM. L.
REV. 452, 454 n.16 (1972)(quoting Weckstein, Boulder II: Why and How, 41 U. COLO.
L. REV. 304, 308-09 (1969)). See also T. SHAFFER AND R. REDMOUNT, LAWYERS, LAW
STUDENTS AND PEOPLE (1977); Pipkin, Law School Instruction in Professional Re-
sponsibility: A Curricular Paradox, A.B.F. RESEARCH J. 247 (1979).
15. Smedley, The Pervasive Approach on a Large Scale- "The Vanderbilt Ex-
periment," 15 J. LEGAL EDUC. 435 (1963). It has been pointed out "[tihat changes in
the curriculum are the answer to all public deficiencies is, of course, in keeping with
the great American tradition of painless reform. Everything from the study of Chau-
cer to the pursuit of 'social science' has been proposed to this end." J. SHKLAR, LE-
GALISM 19 (1964).
16. Smedley, supra note 15, at 437 (emphasis added).
17. Id. at 436. See also D. CALLAHAN & S. BOK, ETHICS TEACHING IN HIGHER
EDUCATION (1980). "How to stimulate the moral feelings and imagination of students
...so that an ethics course is not merely 'an abstract intellectual exercise?'" Id. at
117.
18. Memorizing the rules will also be more important with the advent of the
"Ethics Exam" for admission to the Bar. California, Georgia, Kansas, New Hamp-
shire and South Carolina have adopted such an exam. 12 NAT'L BAR J. 1 (1980).
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self-the appellate opinion-is completely devoid of any dis-
cussion of ethical issues?
The significance of teaching professional responsibility in
law school should be more than merely to enlarge the meaning
of "thinking like a lawyer" 1 to include the ability to spot and
analyze ethical issues. In educating students to be profession-
als, the law school has an impact on how the person will ulti-
mately behave in that role.20 If one accepts the proposition
that law school can and should have an important part to play
in the formation of a person's "identity" as a lawyer, then one
must look closely and analyze the role models for lawyering
which are provided for law students.21
In the traditional legal educational setting the student
will have the law professor as the only live role model for a
lawyer.2 2 This is clearly not all bad. The stereotypical image
of the law professor is of a very bright, articulate, intellectual
19. See, e.g., K. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH: ON OUR LAW AND ITS STUDY
(1951); Elkins, The Legal Persona: An Essay on the Professional Mask, 64 VA. L.
REV. 735 (1978).
20. Our society prolongs the period of adolescence to a large extent
through the intensive and extensive imposed process of education. The
issue of a person's "identity" is thus kept open for quite a long time. It
is precisely upon this area of personality function that the important
lessons of professional behavior should focus .... The universal human
need to have objects for modeling and identity formation may be the
single most important psychological factor in the educational pro-
cess . . . .It is critical then that legal educators avoid reinforcement of
inappropriate lawyer behavior and avidly grasp every opportunity to re-
inforce positively those behaviors which are vital to effective and appro-
priate professional practice.
Watson, Lawyers and Professionalism: A Further Psychiatric Perspective on Legal
Education, in NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON TEACHING PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITv,
MATERIALS & PROCEEDINGS FROM THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE 631, 633 (P. Keenan, ed.
1979).
21. "It is axiomatic that professional ethics are taught by precept and exam-
ple." Hyde, The Duty and Obligations of the Bar for the Maintenance of Profes-
sional Standards, 29 S. CAL. L. REv. 81, 82 (1955) (emphasis in original). This same
analysis can be made from a more sociological perspective. In those terms one would
speak of "socializ[ing] students adequately into the ethical norms of the legal profes-
sion." Pipkin, supra note 14, at 265.
22. "Because law students only rarely have conceptualized the way in which
they shall become working lawyer-professionals, the law faculty and other persons
who teach them how to behave as lawyers become extremely important to such ulti-
mate shaping." Watson, On Teaching Lawyers Professionalism: A Continuing Psy-
chiatric Analysis in CLINICAL EDUCATION FOR THE LAW STUDENT 139, 141 (1973)
(working papers prepared for the Council on Legal Educ. for Professional Responsi-
bility, Inc.. Nat'l Conference). See generally L. FRIEDMAN & S. MACAULAY, LAW AND
THE BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES 829-31 (1969) (discussion of role theory).
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and all-knowing person.28 However, the law-teaching profes-
sion has successfully separated itself into a category distinct
from the lawyering profession,2' and to that extent students
do not see law professors as appropriate role models or men-
tors. There has been some change in the last ten years with
the advent of clinical programs in most law schools. 5 Still, the
clinical programs are most often in a public interest type of
practice, and the clinical teacher is frequently seen as an out-
sider in academia-a "do-gooder," not really accepted or ac-
ceptable as an appropriate role model as a professional.2
If this analysis is correct as to the difficulty of having the
law professor as an important role model, then the pervasive
approach will not ring true to the student. If the teacher
points out the "latent"27 ethical issues in a case, most stu-
dents will assume that the "ivory tower" academic is again
playing an analytical game. 8 If this ethical issue were truly
important in the "real" world of lawyering it would not be
"latent," but explicit.
To look at this same point from another perspective, one
must realize that law students spend far and away the most
time with the written appellate decision. When law students
are asked a non-statutory legal question, the thought process
which they go through is one of retrieving the most analogous
case or cases from their memory and comparing the facts
given in the question to what the court said and did. In this
sense law students and practicing lawyers are legal realists.2
To the practicing lawyer the law is what the judge before
whom the case will be heard says it is. To the student the law
is the "majority opinion" or the state's highest court's written
23. SHAFFER & REDMOUNT, supra note 14, at 157.
24. J. AUERBACH, UNEQUAL JUSTICE 74-75 (1976); SHAFFER & REDMOUNT, supra
note 14.
25. COUNCIL ON LEGAL EDUC. FOR PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, INC.: SURVEY
AND DIRECTORY OF CLINICAL LEGAL EDUCATION- 1978-1979 (1979).
26. Watson, supra note 20, at 619.
27. Smedley, supra note 15.
28. "[I]deas about professional behavior which are picked up from practicing
lawyers, whatever the character of that behavior may be, will be eagerly grasped and
emulated by the student, who must learn how to live and practice as a lawyer." Wat-
son, supra note 22, at 142 (emphasis in original).
29. See, e.g., Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARv. L. REV. 457 (1897). See
also W. TWINING, KARL LLEWELLYN AND THE REALIST MOVEMENT (1973); J. FRANK,
LAW AND THE MODERN MIND (1930); K. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH: ON OUR LAW
AND ITS STUDY (1951).
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opinion. The students' image of both the real world and "the
law" is built from their study of appellate opinions, the raw
material of most law school courses.
Legal education spends considerable time and effort
teaching and testing "issue spotting." Issue spotting is the lin-
ing up of the elements in a narrative of an event against a
legal rule (as derived from and delineated by appellate opin-
ions) and analyzing and articulating where they clearly fit to-
gether, where they clearly do not fit together, and where there
can be arguments as to whether they do or do not fit. 0 The
ability to spot issues determines to a large extent a student's
academic success. In most law school exams the student is
told that how one resolves the "issue" is not nearly as impor-
tant as spotting it and making the right arguments concerning
it.
These two central features of legal education bear directly
on the ability to teach ethics."' The students' image of the
"real world" of the law is built on the appellate opinion, and
the students are told that there is great value and great re-
ward"2 given to the ability to spot issues. With the importance
of these two aspects of legal education, assigned appellate
opinions which are not sensitive to and do not deal explicitly
with the ethical issues inherent in them create powerful nega-
tive ethical models.88
The student sees that it is in court opinions that one
finds the real world of the profession, and that world is not
concerned with ethical issues. From the student's perspective
it appears that only ivory tower academicians worry about
such things. The real world of the legal profession does not
have a pervasive approach to ethics. Courts which appear
blind to ethical issues in their opinions can only reinforce the
impression that ethical issues are not worth spotting-that a
30. E. LEvi, AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING 1-2 (1948). See also Elkins,
supra note 19, at 742 ("mental categorization and classification").
31. A statistical analysis using a law student's perceptions of his education, al-
beit with somewhat different factors, comes to the same conclusion. "[Tihe prevailing
mode of instruction in fact socializes students into the belief that legal ethics are not
important." Pipkin, supra note 14, at 274 (emphasis in original).
32. The system shows them that good issue spotting equals good grades, which
equals good jobs, which equals the good life-success.
33. "To a large extent people behave as they are expected to behave and their
expectations arise less from what they are told than from the examples they observe."
Weckstein, Watergate and the Law Schools, 12 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 261, 278 (1975).
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lawyer will not be rewarded for dealing with them openly and
honestly."' The appellate opinion, the most meaningful model
and professional identity maker, teaches that one deals with
ethics only when forced to. That makes a mockery of what we
are trying to communicate-that as professionals, ethics
should pervade our thoughts and actions because that is one
of the major factors which differentiates our profession from a
business."s
Teaching ethics will never be done "well enough," yet the
need to strive for this goal must still be nurtured. If we give
up, we teach "contempt for ethical behavior .... [P]latitudes
not only cannot overcome example, they turn the example
into destructive hypocrisy."3 0 Although a change in how the
bench approaches the ethical behavior of the profession will
obviously not solve all-or everi most-of the problems of
producing lawyers who behave ethically, it certainly must be a
component of any movement toward solutions.
3 7
III. THE ROLE OF COURTS IN THE ENFORCEMENT OF ETHICS
Many studies have determined that a core problem of the
structure of the legal profession's ethical-disciplinary system
is the initiating mechanism for investigations of lawyers' con-
duct." The three major sources of information, or the initia-
34. See generally E. FROMM, MAN FOR HIMSELF-AN INQUIRY INTO THE PSYCHOL-
OGY OF ETHICS (1947). "Indeed, the fear of disapproval and the need for approval
seem to be the most powerful and almost exclusive motivation for ethical judgment."
Id. at 11.
35. "In short, with respect to a capacity to distinguish in ethical matters, we
may be fast losing our status as a profession and becoming nothing more than skilled
merchant clerks." E. CAHN, CONFRONTING INJUSTICE 257 (1962). See also note 104
infra.
36. J. LIBERMAN, CRISIS AT THE BAR 208 (1978). Chief Justice Burger's quotation
at the beginning of this article-the pregnant illusion-makes the same point, supra
note 1.
37. Rosenhan, Moral Character, 27 STAN. L. REV. 925, 934-35 (1975).
38. "Only after the identification function is improved are prosecutorial and ad-
judicatory procedures and policies of primary importance. Without adequate infor-
mation input, the system cannot attend to, because it does not know about, the ma-
jority of instances of lawyers' misconduct." Steele & Nimmer, Lawyers, Clients and
Professional Regulation, 1976 ABF RES. J. 917, 1005. See also ABA SPECIAL COMMIT-
TEE ON EvALUATION OF DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT 168 (Final Draft, June 1970) (here-
inafter cited as CLARK REPORT); Weckstein, Maintaining the Integrity and Compe-
tence of the Legal Profession, 48 TEx. L. REV. 267, 282 (1979); Thode, The Duty of
Lawyers and Judges to Report Other Lawyers' Breaches of the Standards of the
Legal Profession, 1976 UTAH L. REV. 95.
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tion of investigations, are (1) the public, usually a client, (2)
the profession, or (3) a professional police force of some sort.
The first source, the public, has been and will continue to be
the major triggering mechanism in the disciplinary system.
The deficiencies and gaps in this "de facto delegat[ion] to
nonprofessionals" s is well established.
The source which, at least since the Clark Report, has re-
ceived the most attention has been some sort of professional
policing force."0 Having an omniscient and omnipotent police
force would, of course, end most of our profession's ethical vi-
olations. If professional police were everywhere, very few law-
yers would violate the law. But this extreme remedy would
have such a chilling effect on advocacy that our profession
would lose its raison d'etre. Clearly the reforms and expan-
sion of the professional policing mechanism which the Clark
Report seems to have set in motion have been beneficial with-
out approaching this totalitarian extreme. Movement in that
direction is still needed and will be beneficial for both the
profession and the public."1 Nevertheless, there must be a via-
ble and visible counterweight to slow the movement toward
more and better policing. Without such a counterweight, the
pressure from the public4 will push the expansion of the pro-
fessional police force to a point where there will be a signifi-
cant diminution of the profession's ability to be the zealous
advocate and champion of the individual caught in the tenta-
cles of the legal system. 3
The only other source of a counterweight is from the pro-
fession itself, but reports by lawyers of other lawyers' ethical
violations have been a very small percentage of the work of
39. Steele & Nimmer, supra note 38, at 974.
40. Steele & Nimmer, supra note 38, at 1005.
41. For example, the work now being done on peer review with the emphasis on
remedial rather than punitive action towards the lawyer. ALI-ABA COMMITTEE ON
CONTINUING PROFESSIONAL EDUCATION, A MODEL PEER REVIEW SYSTEM-(Discussion
Draft April 15, 1980). The medical profession is going through the same process. F.
GRAD & N. MARTI, PHYSICIAN'S LICENSURE AND DISCIPLINE (1979).
42. This pressure will most likely grow if for no other reason than that there is
an increasing number of lawyers, law suits and areas into which litigation is reaching.
With almost all lawsuits there will be losers, some of whom will transfer their disap-
pointment or anger to their lawyer.
43. "[T]he bar increasingly will become the object of public scrutiny through
nonjudicial, and thus more explicitly political, regulation." Wolfram, Barriers to Ef-
fective Public Participation in Regulation of the Legal Profession, 62 MINN. L. REV.
619, 621 (1978).
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disciplinary committees.4 The reasons for ineffectiveness of
the intraprofession reporting have been catalogued repeat-
edly.45 All of the economic, social, and emotional pressures on
lawyers militate against making accusations against other
members of the bar.
In our society the person who blows the whistle occupies
a very ambiguous position."6 In common parlance and even in
law review articles' 7 pejorative terms such as "squeal," "rat,"
"stool pigeon," and "gestapo" are used freely. People often
say and believe that such action somehow does violence to
"basic ethical notions.' '8 As a parent one can remember using
the devastating "put down" of, "Don't be a tattle-tale." On
the other hand, we give and have been given messages such as,
"Why didn't you tell me that Johnny was. . . ?"'9 Or think of
press treatment of incidents where large numbers of people do
nothing while some horrendous crime is unfolding before
them. At best, our culture gives us very ambiguous guidance.5
One must add to this general ambivalance the special
pressures on a lawyer. The other lawyer is a colleague, and
therefore one empathizes with him or her. There is also the
real problem of the lawyer who is not a member of the "club":
he also makes mistakes,"' he needs help and favors, and he
has to work with these people.2 The Clark Report found
"outright hostility" from the practicing bar toward discipli-
44. See Steele & Nimmer, supra note 38; Marks & Cathcart, Discipline Within
the Legal Profession: Is it Self-Regulation? 1974 U. oF ILL. L.F. 193 (1974).
45. See authorities cited in note 38 supra. See also McCracken, The Mainte-
nance of Professional Standards: Duty and Obligation of the Courts, 29 S. CAL. L.
REv. 65 (1955).
46. CALLAHAN & BOK, supra note 17, Chapter XI.
47. See, e.g., Weckstein, supra note 38; Note, The "Stool Pigeon" Canons: A
Comment on Certain Sections of Canons 28 and 29 of the ABA Code of Ethics, 41
CONN. BAR J. 339 (1967).
48. The Model Rules of Professional Conduct: Report of New York City Re-
gional Hearings Before the Commission on Evaluation of Professional Standards, 66
ABA J. 704 (1980) (Testimony of Professor Gray Thoron).
49. CALLAHAN & BOK, supra note 17, at 289. Also relevant is the Biblical admo-
nition: "He that is without sin among you, let him first cast a stone at her." John 8:7.
50. V. NAVASKY, NAMING NAMES (1980).
51. "This factor of identifying the potential evil in oneself with the misbehavior
of others is probably the single greatest factor that inhibits peer discipline." Watson,
supra note 20, at 637 n.29.
52. "[A] much stronger relationship was found between their needs for affilia-
tion and helpfulness and their tendency to cheat." Rosenhan, supra note 37, at 929.
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nary enforcement." A lawyer who follows the ethical duty and
reports instances of questionable conduct will be viewed with,
if not hostility, at least suspicion and as a consequence the
lawyer's practice may suffer.
I have never heard of (or been able to find reported) a
lawyer disciplined or even investigated for violating DR 1-
103(A): "A lawyer possessing unprivileged knowledge of a vio-
lation of DR 1-102 [any other Disciplinary Rule] shall report
such knowledge to a tribunal or other authority empowered to
investigate or act upon such violation." 54 It is interesting to
note that the present "Discussion Draft of ABA Model Rules
of Professional Conduct"55 would weaken the language of the
reporting requirement. The draft proposes that a lawyer only
be required to report a violation if it is "substantial. '"56 It has
been pointed out that "lawyers with their quibbling minds
will always be able to rationalize a breach as less than sub-
stantial by some defensible theory."5 " Even this emasculated
reporting requirement, however, appears to be too much for a
segment of the ABA, which wants the entire rule abandoned.58
But this debate is as hypocritical as it is academic. In the past
lawyers have not initiated significant numbers of complaints
against their colleagues and there is no indication that they
will do so in the future.
If the bar does not function as the counterweight to the
professional police force, then the only other segment of the
profession which might fill the role is the bench. The Code of
Judicial Conduct, 3B(3) provides that a judge has the respon-
sibility to initiative disciplinary measures against judges or
lawyers for unprofessional conduct. Although there may be
some question about the mandatory nature of the reporting
requirement for judges," there is no ambiguity that the Code
says it should be done. Yet the literature" and my own survey
of reported opinions indicate that judges are no more likely to
53. CLARK REPORT, supra note 38.
54. ABA MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY AND CODE OF JUDICIAL
CONDUCT DR 1-103(A)(1980).
55. 48 U.S.L.W. 1 (Supp. No. 32, 1980).
56. Id. at 30.
57. 49 U.S.L.W. 2126, 2127 (1980)(Testimony of Michael Franck).
58. Id.
59. Robinson, The Arkansas Code of Professional Responsibility, 33 ARK. L.
REV. 605, 608 n.13 (1980).
60. See Steele & Nimmer, supra note 38.
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report lawyer misconduct than are mere lawyers.
The lack of judicial activity in reporting ethical violations
has been the subject of some rather caustic criticism:
The failure of grievance committees to stalk incompe-
tence is mirrored by the abysmal record of the courts.
During the past several years, many judges, most notably
Chief Justice Warren E. Burger, have complained that a
significant number of advocates who appear before them
are incompetent. Trial judges constantly swap stories
about lawyers they had to rescue discreetly from a sinking
case. Numerous courts have had to grapple with the seri-
ous question of whether to overturn a criminal conviction
because the defendant had 'inadequate assistance of
counsel' . . . . Yet neither the Chief Justice nor the other
judges have forwarded the names of obviously unskilled
and incompetent attorneys to disciplinary committees for
appropriate action.61
The standard explanation of this judicial inactivity paral-
lels that for lawyers in general.2 Judges are lawyers and are
subject to the social and personal feelings for the members of
their profession. Nevertheless, judges are different from law-
yers in ways which should mandate a more active role, or at
least make the excuses less tenable.
If judges are excused from their duty to initiate discipli-
nary actions because they were once lawyers, one could as eas-
ily throw out their function as impartial decision makers,
since judges were all biased advocates prior to their "eleva-
tion." Our system requires that judges shed their role as advo-
cates upon taking the oath of judicial office. As in all human
activities, some judges are more successful in being impartial
than others. It is, however, expected both by the system and
by the people within the system that judges will be impartial,
and to some extent at least this is a self-fulfilling expectation.
By becoming a judge a lawyer is expected to change. He or she
is being paid to make decisions, often hard decisions, concern-
ing people and their actions. It certainly does not seem too
much to expect that judges take their separation (elevation)
from the bar seriously enough to be able to fulfill their duty to
61. LIBERMAN, supra note 36, at 203-04. See also Aronson, Reforms Needed to
Correct Malaise in Enforcement of Canons of Ethics, NAT'L L.J., Nov. 26, 1979 at 27,
col. 1; FREEDMAN, LAWYERS' ETHICS IN AN ADVERSARY SYSTEM 101 (1975).
62. See, e.g., Steele & Nimmer, supra note 38.
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report ethical violations. Until they do so, the lack of judicial
action will be the highest level of hypocrisy in the entire self-
regulatory system.
Other factors should also be considered to give judges
greater obligations to initiate ethics complaints. A judge is a
salaried employee of the government and thereby is not vul-
nerable by being excluded from the bar. This situation is
clearly much different from a lawyer in private practice, espe-
cially outside of the large urban areas, whose business and
financial well-being is to a significant extent dependent on not
being a "pariah."
The higher up in the judicial structure, the weaker are
the pressures not to report. The appellate judge will have
fewer official contacts with any one lawyer."' On a less tangi-
ble level, there are factors of status and role which give the
appellate judge a greater ability to act. Such judges regularly
are called upon to make decisions that put them at odds with
the judges below them. Logically, the hard and painful ques-
tions about individual lawyer's conduct should be one more
step removed, and therefore somewhat easier.
A final factor to be put in the balance on the side of judi-
cial activism in this area is the "inherent power doctrine."
This judicially-created doctrine keeps the regulation of the le-
gal profession almost exclusively within the judicial branch of
government. A judicial position that "we and only we have
the power to regulate the legal profession, but that we, as in-
dividuals, will not do it because it is so unpleasant or not a
proper function of a judge," is indefensible.
A. Dangers of an Activist Judiciary
If judges become more active in enforcing ethical rules
there is a danger that advocacy before them will be compro-
mised. There are instances of courts, usually in league with
others, using disciplinary procedures against lawyers who are
representing unpopular clients and causes. 65 If more judges
63. An exception to this would be some government lawyers.
64. Wolfram, supra note 43; Wajert v. State Ethics Comm., 420 A.2d 439
(1980). "[This] Court declares that it has inherent and exclusive power to supervise
the conduct of attorneys .... 420 A.2d at 442 (quoting Pa.R.D.E. 103).
65. Note, Controlling Lawyers by Bar Associations and Courts, 5 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 301 (1970). A suit by a well known Virginia civil rights attorney
charging that State Bar officials used their disciplinary process to harass him was
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saw their roles as ethical activists there would be a greater
likelihood of blatant political use of the process.
A general chilling of zealous advocacy before courts might
also be a side effect of having lawyers know that both they
and their clients are being "judged." In In Re Bithroney,6
Judge Coffin discussed the dangers of inhibiting zealous advo-
cacy and the need for "breathing room for the fullest possible
exercise of the advocacy function."'67 He went on to state:
Even at this point we might hesitate to take disciplinary
action, sensitive to even the slightest possibility of casting
an inhibitory shadow upon the ardor of those who prac-
tice before us. But even more serious [than filing appeals
in bad faith] in our view was respondent's complete fail-
ure to diligently pursue prosecution of four of the
appeals. 8
Nevertheless, no matter how sensitive courts are in enforcing
ethical conduct, there will inevitably be actions which a law-
yer will not take, due to fear of having his or her ethics pub-
licly questioned.
Another problem posed by an ethically-activist bench
would be the greater danger of unfairly, if unintentionally,
causing damage to an "innocent" lawyer. 9 It is advocated in
this article that judges, sua sponte, and explicitly in written
opinions, state that what they have read in the record or actu-
ally seen before them in court is enough to warrant an investi-
gation. The court would then refer the matter to the appropri-
ate body to determine whether there has been a violation of
an ethical mandate. This would be done without the matter
settled and the officials admitted that they had engaged in "unfairness and procedu-
ral irregularities." Richmond Times Dispatch, Dec. 20, 1975, at A-i, col. 2. See also
Greene v. Virginia State Bar Ass'n., 411 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Va. 1976), in which an
activist Black lawyer found that the regional disciplinary committee had "an exten-
sive file .. .on his activities .. .apparently contain[ing] information on his profes-
sional and non-professional background." 411 F. Supp. at 517.
66. 486 F.2d 319 (1st Cir. 1973).
67. Id. at 322.
68. Id. at 323. The court's reasoning appears to be inconsistent. If the respon-
dent-lawyer had "diligently" pursued the frivolous appeals he would have com-
pounded his abuse of the system. The court, however, must have felt that it had to
support its action with a statement about a lawyer's duty to his or her client and
therefore reached out for this "zealous advocacy" basis for decision.
69. "[The] dangers of whistleblowing: of uses in error or in malice; of work and
reputations unjustly lost for those falsely accused; of privacy invaded, and trust un-
dermined." CALLAHAN & BOK, supra note 17, at 279.
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having been presented to the court as an issue in the case, and
the lawyer would not be given the opportunity to present his
or her side.70 Obviously it will sometimes happen that what
was in the record was not in fact correct or was ethically justi-
fiable when other factors are considered.7 1 In such cases an
innocent lawyer will have had his or her reputation damaged
by a court opinion questioning the propriety of an action.7 2
Fairness to the accused person is a serious problem when-
ever the system has questions about a person's actions (e.g.,
investigation or indictment). Courts might mitigate possible
damage through careful use of language in these opinions.
Ironically, the fact that the accusations would be in appellate
court opinions would probably lessen the damage to the law-
yer's reputation because of one of the factors which keeps law-
yers from turning in other lawyers-empathy. While reading
the cases for this article I found myself thinking of all the
possible things that would justify or excuse the conduct of the
lawyer about whom I was reading. Generally, lawyers are the
only people who regularly read appellate opinions and by
their identification with the lawyer in the opinion, they are
more inclined to take the accusations for what they are.
The danger that a false accusation will be spread on the
record is inherent in any open system of discipline. One has to
weigh the possibility of damage to innocent lawyers against
the benefits.78 Part of this process will depend on the weight
one gives to the need to strengthen the enforcement system,
which in turn depends on one's view of the degree of defi-
ciency of lawyers' ethics. 74 Such an evaluation is not under-
taken in this article, but there seem to be grave and substan-
tial deficiencies.
A question might also arise concerning the due process
70. What is being suggested is merely the reporting-triggering mechanism, not
the investigatory or adjudicatory procedures.
71. "Justification plays such a large role in behavior that its openendedness cre-
ates serious difficulties for moral education." Rosenhan, supra note 37, at 930.
72. In an analogous area, in making public the disciplinary/adjudicatory proce-
dure, the A.B.A. has recommended openness. There appears, however, to be very
strong opposition because of "the specter of sensationalist newspaper publicity about
a flimsy allegation of misconduct." Nat'l L.J., Dec. 8, 1980, at 12, col. 3.
73. With the admonitions about the appearance of impropriety in the Code, the
number of "completely innocent" lawyers should be quite small. ABA CANONS OF
PROFESSIONAL ETHICS No. 9.
74. Or how bad the public thinks it is. See notes 42 and 43 supra.
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implications posed by a court which initiated the investiga-
tion and then sat in judgment on it. If the highest court of the
state made the complaint the possibility exists that the same
court might be required to review on appeal any disciplinary
action. There would be a somewhat analogous situation when
an attorney is convicted of a crime and an appeal is heard by
the state's highest court and then that court is asked to review
disciplinary action flowing from the conviction. Also, it is cer-
tainly not unusual for appellate courts to review cases, aspects
of which they had reviewed and made decisions on before.
Our notions of fundamental fairness8 7  would not be offended
by an appellate court reviewing disciplinary action which re-
sulted from an investigation it had requested.76
B. Effectiveness of Active Judicial Enforcement
There clearly are dangers and costs to judicial activism in
this area. The benefits to be derived from active judicial en-
forcement must be analyzed in order to make an informed de-
cision. The first part of this paper set out the benefits to the
next generation of lawyers and their clients from an educa-
tional experience that is meaningful and real in terms of what
will be expected of lawyers. Also, more immediate benefits will
be derived for each of the three traditional functions of self-
regulation:77 (1) to identify and remove seriously deviant
members of the bar (the cleansing function);7 8 (2) to deter
75. See generally Morgan v. United States, 304 U.S. 1, 19 (1938).
76. However, the Oklahoma Supreme Court recently declared it a violation of
due process for the same court to prosecute and judge an ethical violation.
While as a legislator in the arena of bar ethics and discipline, this court
can and does fashion, by rules, the necessary prosecutorial machinery, it
cannot itself exercise enforcement powers for, or on behalf of, the in-
strumentality it has created .... An exercise of both functions would be
inconsistent with this court's constitutionally-mandated responsibility
for adjudication of bar disciplinary proceedings.
Tweedy v. Oklahoma Bar Ass'n., 624 P.2d 1049, 1055 (1981). There is, of course, a
significant difference between prosecuting ethical violations and merely reporting or
initiating investigations.
The Massachusetts Court of Appeals, in a more apposite situation, reasoned dif-
ferently. Counsel moved for recusal of the judge in a case where the presiding judge
had referred a matter to the disciplinary committee. The court held that: "[tihere is
no basis for concluding that the prior incident affected the judge's ability to render
impartial judgments." Commonwealth v. Cresta, 3 Mass. App. Ct. 560, 565, 336
N.E.2d 910, 915 (1975).
77. See Steele & Nimmer, supra note 38, at 999.
78. This category should be expanded to include a competency identification
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other lawyers; and (3) to maintain enough action to forestall
public intervention.
First, the "cleansing" function of the disciplinary system
would obviously be furthered by the removal of "deviant"
lawyers whom the court identified and referred for investiga-
tion. It is undoubtedly true, however, that much seriously un-
ethical conduct never comes to the attention of any court (for
example, those things that lawyers do for and to clients in the
privacy of their offices). One might assume, however, that
most of the lawyers whose unethical practices come to the no-
tice of a court are engaging in a substantial amount of evil in
private. Therefore, if a court-initiated investigation eventually
removes them from practice or forces them to change their
ways, one would assume that both their overt and covert dam-
age will be ended. On a much larger scale (and in the long run
probably much more beneficial) courts would be able to iden-
tify lawyers who need help to become competent practition-
ers, and could require individualized education and training
for them.
Second, the deterrence function Is would clearly be en-
hanced in those cases which the lawyer knows will end up
before a court. In much of what lawyers do there is the possi-
bility that some part will end up before a court. Unethical
conduct is more likely to be deterred if it is known and under-
stood by lawyers that conduct that looked unethical and
comes to the notice of a judge will be automatically and
openly referred for investigation.
One quasi-deterrent effect would be in educating (or re-
educating) lawyers as to what is, in fact, unethical. The spe-
cific ethical rule would be articulated in the opinion. There-
fore, the fact that such conduct is accepted practice by
lawyers in an area will not diminish the ethical standards for
other lawyers in the area by "custom and usage." Court opin-
ions would bring to lawyers' consciousness the impropriety of
the action and the knowledge that in the larger world of the
and educational procedures aimed at remedying deficiencies in a lawyer's knowledge
and/or skills. See, e.g., In re Edmondson, 518 F.2d 552 (9th Cir. 1975) (lawyer sus-
pended from practice before the court for six months and until the court is satisfied
that he is familiar with the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure).
79. See generally H. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION (1968);
Hughes, Should Alfie Be Let Off?, 27 N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS No. 18 at 47 (Nov. 20,
1980).
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profession it will not be tolerated.
Finally, the third function of our disciplinary system-to
maintain enough action to forestall public interven-
tion-would be enhanced. This is essentially a public relations
or image problem and an active bench would take away the
charge of hypocrisy with which judges are so effectively at-
tacked.80 By openly and honestly dealing with ethical ques-
tions, courts would have to have a salutory effect on the image
of the entire legal profession.
IV. How MIGHT A CHANGE COME ABOUT?
There are reported cases in which courts, apparently on
their own motion, publicly refer attorneys to ethics commit-
tees. A court will probably act if the situation is particularly
egregious. In one case the Supreme Court of New Jersey di-
rected "that proceedings be had"81 against an attorney for
neglect 82 in a capital case which subjected his client to the
danger of execution. The same attorney, the court added, had
been disbarred and readmitted once before. There are a few
other instances in which it appears courts acted out of petu-
lance or exasperation in referring lawyers to ethics commit-
tees.8 3 In these situations there is almost no residual deter-
rence or lesson except for the lawyer involved in the action
(i.e., there is only a specific as opposed to a general deter-
rence). In the first type of case the lawyer's conduct is so out-
rageous that others will quickly put the decision out of their
minds as an aberration. The second case could not deter or
teach in a meaningful way since it does not set out the con-
duct and the ethical standard.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
appears to be the only court which has consistently published
opinions with the names and deeds of attorneys who have
been derelict in their ethical duties to their clients. 4 It also
80. See, e.g., authorities cited in note 61 supra.
81. In re McDermit, 96 N.J.L. 17, 114 A. 144 (1921).
82. Id. at 21, 114 A. at 146. The inference can be drawn that the attorney's
action was more like extortion. He apparently was trying to get more money by hold-
ing up further work on the appeal.
83. See, e.g., Gullo v. Hirst, 332 F.2d 178 (4th Cir. 1964)(the case appears to
have grown out of a messy domestic battle in which one of the lawyers was related to
a party).
84. See, e.g., In re Young, 537 F.2d 326 (9th Cir. 1976); In re Morris, 521 F.2d
794 (9th Cir. 1975); United States v. Ferrara, 469 F.2d 83 (9th Cir. 1972); In re Chan-
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appears from these opinions that the court is initiating the
disciplinary proceedings, but these cases are criminal cases
and it is possible that the United States Attorneys' Offices are
the real moving parties. These opinions go back a number of
years, and it would be valuable to design a study to determine
whether there are measurable differences in either ethics or
advocacy in that circuit compared to other circuits.
A recent development is a formal announcement of the
Supreme Court of Arkansas that it will publish the names of
attorneys who "without good cause" miss a deadline for filing.
an appeal, and that they will be referred to the Committee on
Professional Conduct.8 One wonders what the disciplinary
committee will do other than determine an appropriate sanc-
tion since the court will apparently have determined the lack
of "good cause." Also, one wonders how the "good cause" is-
sue is to be decided?
By contrast, the Second Circuit has stated: "The business
of the court is to dispose of litigation and not to act as a gen-
eral overseer of the ethics of those who practice here unless
the questioned behavior taints the trial of the cause before
it."'8 6 There clearly appears to be a strong presumption in the
minds of most judges against being active in ethical matters.
This attitude most often manifests itself in a lack of comment
or action in cases which presumptively include ethical issues
such as ineffective assistance of counsel,87 legal malpractice,8
or Rule 11 (honesty in pleading cases).89 Nevertheless, when
one reads cases and articles with this question in mind, one
finds explicit comments on how judges perceive their role.
dler, 450 F.2d 813 (9th Cir. 1971).
85. Robinson, supra note 59.
86. W.T. Grant Co. v. Haines, 531 F.2d 671, 677 (2d Cir. 1976). But see Lowen-
schuss v. Bluhdorn, 613 F.2d 18 (2d Cir. 1980) where the Second Circuit affirmed
disqualification of counsel who was also class representative in an antitrust suit, and
where there was a "pattern of highly improper conduct ... making basess and un-
justified personal and professional attacks upon numerous reputable persons in the
case." Id. at 20. Moreover, the court stated that "the Pennsylvania Bar Association is
requested to review [the counsel's] conduct in this case, see Amer. Bar Ass'n. Code of
Jud. Cond. Canon 3 B(3) and to take such action as is appropriate." Id. at 21.
87. See, e.g., Proffitt v. United States, 582 F.2d 854 (4th Cir. 1978); Schwartz,
Dealing with Incompetent Counsel-The Trial Judge's Role, 93 HARV. L. REV. 633
(1980).
88. See Schwartz supra note 87, cases cited at 648 n.67.
89. See FED. R. CIv. PROC. 11. Risinger, Honesty in Pleading and its Enforce-
ment: Some "Striking" Problems with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11, 61 MINN.
L. REV. 1 (1976).
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For example, in Quality Molding Co. v. American Na-
tional Fire Ins. Co.,90 the court had to make a decision as to
what to do with a serious misquotation in a brief. Opposing
counsel stated that the same misquotation had been made in
the district court and that it had been specifically called to
counsel's attention in the trial brief. The court concluded:
"[A] deliberate misquotation calls for strong condemnation.
However, we do not initiate disciplinary action in this court
because there is a bare possibility that the fact that counsel's
quotation was not correct might not have come to the per-
sonal attention of the attorney preparing the brief in this
court .... "9 This sets the appropriate procedure on its head.
One needs proof beyond a reasonable doubt-"bare possibil-
ity"-before one initiates an action.
In a volume devoted to the teaching of ethics in law
schools, a United States district court judge implied that such
misquotation is not uncommon: "On several occasions my law
clerks and I have had conferences about certain lawyers and
their use of misquotations from opinions. Sometimes quota-
tions are manufactured. It's hard to give fair consideration to
briefs from such lawyers the next time around."9 ' It appears
that to this judge the issue is not ethics, but mere credibility.
Any movement in this area will have to come about
through changes in individual judges' perceptions of their
role. 8 Changing how a powerful and insular group of people
perceive their job, after they have been trained and have per-
formed on the job in a different way, is a long-term proposi-
tion. One sensible place to begin would be at the top. The
Supreme Court's opinions are the primary written source of
teaching and learning in the legal profession, both during and
after law school. Also, one would assume that the Justices are
judicial role models."4
Although the present Chief Justice's speeches might sug-
gest otherwise, it seems clear that the Court does not see itself
as having a significant role to play in this area. Take for ex-
90. 287 F.2d 313 (7th Cir. 1961).
91. Id. at 316 (emphasis added).
92. P. KEENAN, TEACHING PROF. RESP., MATERIALS & PROCEEDINGS FROM THE
NATIONAL CONFERENCE 9-10 (1979).
93. Legislative or executive action would be nullified by the "inherent powers"
doctrine. See note 64 supra.
94. See Watson supra note 22.
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ample the recent case of Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper.5
The question presented to the Court was whether attorney's
fees could be assessed against the plaintiffs' attorneys person-
ally, pursuant to certain statutes. The opinion catalogues the
lawyers' abuse of the judicial process. The list goes from "un-
cooperative behavior"'  and "deliberate inaction"' 8 to their
having "improvidently enlarged and inadequately prose-
cuted""" the action. From the description of the lawyers' con-
duct the inevitable conclusion is that a prima facie case had
been made that various disciplinary rules had been violated.100
Yet not one word about ethics appears in the opinion.10' The
entire discussion is in terms of money-who should bear the
costs of the presumptively unethical conduct.'1 2 When the Su-
preme Court's perception of ethical violations is solely in
terms of dollars and cents one can hardly expect lawyers (and
law students) to see themselves in a "profession" as opposed
to a mere business. 03
95. 447 U.S. 752 (1980). The only reference I have found to this case starts off
with a statement implying that the Court was too concerned with matters of "compe-
tence and the abuse of judicial processes."
It is a remarkable commentary on the level of rhetoric in the continuing
debate over lawyer competence and the abuse of judicial processes that
the U.S. Supreme Court can find itself blandly citing Charles Dickens'
Bleak House for the proposition that "[d]ue to sloth, inattention, or de-
sire to seize tactical advantage, lawyers have long indulged in dilatory
practices. "
Sinclair, Dilatory Behavior of Counsel: Roadway's Warning on Liability, Nat'l L.J.,
Aug. 11, 1980, at 19, col. 1.
96. 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (1976) (allowing a court to tax excess costs incurred when a
lawyer unreasonably and vexatiously increases costs); 42 U.S.C. §§ 1988, 2000 e-5 (k)
(Supp. II 1978) (allowing recovery of attorney fees as a part of the costs of litigation).
97. 447 U.S. at 754.
98. Id. at 755.
99. Id. at 756.
100. ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, DISCIPLINARY RULE 1-102 (miscon-
duct); DISCIPLINARY RULE 6-101 (failure to act competently); DISCIPLINARY RULE 7-101
(failure to represent client zealously).
101. Nor is there a mention of ethics in the opinions of the courts below. Monk
v. Roadway Express, Inc., 73 F.R.D. 411 (W.D.La. 1977), aff'd 599 F.2d 1378 (5th Cir.
1979). Nor from what I have been able to find has any disciplinary investigation or
action been taken. Letter on file.
102. Even this discussion seems rather short-sighted. If the attorneys have to
pay, it may be a deductible business expense and the public ends up paying.
103. In one sense there is an unhealthy elitism in the use of the profession ver-
sus trade example. "[T]he belief that lawyers are somehow above trade has become
an anachronism." Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350, 371-72 (1977). It is,
however, inherent in the concept of self-regulation. The pursuit of profit is not the
only motivating factor (and at least arguably not the primary factor) in the individual
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If the Supreme Court started the process of openly com-
menting on ethical issues inherent in their cases, other courts
would follow. Without leadership or a role model there will be
no movement. 10'
V. CONCLUSION
Although the role of the judiciary in the enforcement of
our profession's ethical standards is but one scene, it affects
the entire play. The judge's ethical code says that judges
should be active, but that mandate is ignored. This sets the
stage for the hypocrisy of the entire production. If self-regula-
tion is to be viable and believable, both to the public and to
the players themselves, there must be some minimum level of
honesty and commitment.
There will be difficult cases where it is questionable
whether a referral to the disciplinary system should be made.
There will probably be an even greater number of cases where
no mention of ethical problems should be made in the pub-
lished opinion, even if a referral is made. But surely there are
cases where both the educational and deterrent values are
paramount. "The answer perhaps is that courts of justice
ought not to be puzzled by such old scholastic questions as to
where a horse's tail begins and where it ceases. You are
obliged to say, 'This is a horse's tail' at some time."' 0 6
lawyer's work. If there is no validity to "the delicate balance between need to earn a
living and his obligation selflessly to serve," id. at 368, then the entire ethical system
is merely a mask to hide the pursuit of the profession's economic self-interest.
104. Alternatively, the political pressures may become so great that the entire
structure of the legal profession is changed radically as, for example, it was during the
Jacksonian Era. C. WARREN, A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN BAR (1911).
105. Lavery v. Pursell, 39 Ch. D. 508 (1888).
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